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Abstract 
Five fictional friends of the author have agreed to meet and talk, hoping that he was right when he 
claimed that discussion crossing the usual boundaries of their fields would enrich their different inquiries 
and concerns. Ecolo, a natural and human ecologist, breaks the ice. He wants to marshall scientific 
knowledge to persuade others of the seriousness of the population problem. He is questioned by Philoso, 
whose philosophical bent leads her to observe the models that people use and to ask how they support 
the claims they make. In turn, the other three join in: Activo, an activist who is interested in what one can 
do on the basis of claims made about the environment and about society; Reso, a researcher who 
analyzes issues about the degradation of natural resources; and Sociolo, who is prepared to bring in 
social considerations to explain or interpret the directions that are taken in science. 
 
Ecolo (natural and human ecologist): Here's a quotation that expresses my concerns about human 
population growth. "We hold it to be self-evident [and] undeniable that prospects for the future would be 
more favourable if there were fewer people on earth" (Okoye and Smith 1994, 11). 
Philoso (who asks how you support your claims): It is not self-evident to me. Can you explain the 
problems associated with a larger population? 
Ecolo: The problems are environmental ones, in particular. The greater the population, the greater the 
erosion of arable lands, consumption of non-renewable resources, and production of greenhouse gases 
and pollutants in general. 
Philoso: What is the basis for these claims? 
Ecolo: I simply extrapolate from past experience. Whatever per capita environmental effect people have 
had in the past will continue, unless something significant happens to change people's livelihoods. 
Philoso: And extrapolating from past experience of growth is also the method you use for projecting 
higher populations in the future-and thus the higher total human environmental impact? 
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Ecolo: Yes, except that demographers take into account the division of the population into separate age 
classes and differences among countries. 
Philoso: Have their past projections panned out? 
Ecolo: In recent decades, yes. [Points to figure 1 -- World population growth: United Nations projections 
from 1963 (dots), superimposed on actual values (curve, from Brown et al. 1996)] 
 
Activo (who asks what one can do on the basis of claims): So what do you propose should be done? 
Ecolo: Population growth should be limited, of course. The most humane way is to promote 
contraception. 
Philoso: Why contraception? 
Ecolo: Obviously, so that fewer children are born and the population growth rate declines. 
Philoso: Have you established that people have children because they lack contraception? 
Ecolo: Can I ask you a question first-Do you really think we can afford the time to follow a path of 
philosophical scepticism? As some of my colleagues have noted, the "struggle merely to support today's 
population at today's living standards is causing environmental destruction on a scale and at a pace 
unprecedented in human history" (Ehrlich et al. 1995, p.1). It is action that is needed, and now. 
Philoso: I think there's always a place for exploring different ways of framing our questions and answers. 
Bear with me for a moment and I hope you'll see this. 
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Ecolo: OK. About contraception then-Research has shown that the number of children desired by 
mothers in the developing world outside China is, on average, 1.1 less than the actual number they had 
(Sinding et al. 1994). 
Philoso: But the basic model is that, averaged over all people of reproductive age, a person tends to have 
X children, and projecting this into the future, the number of humans continues to increase? 
Ecolo: More or less. Demographers also take into account trends in the number of children per person of 
reproductive age and trends in the age at which they have those children. 
Philoso: These details notwithstanding, the model is basically the one common in ecology texts. Future 
population growth is a consequence of current population size. In short, population is the cause of 
population growth. 
Ecolo: Yes. What other model do you propose? 
Philoso: I'm thinking about more recent models in ecology that trace the consequences of individual 
differences such as body size and spatial location. 
Ecolo: I've heard about them, but not made time to understand them well. Remind me of their 
conclusions. 
Philoso: In these so-called individual-based models, the growth trajectories of the population or biomass 
can turn out to be qualitatively different from those predicted by models that apportion the biomass into a 
population of uniform equal individuals (DeAngelis and Gross 1992). 
Ecolo: I've already mentioned that demographers take into account differences among countries. 
Philoso: The results of individual-based models derive not from simply dividing the population into 
different sub-populations, but from the dynamic relations among unequal individuals. Three equal-size 
fish might compete equally for the same food, but if one of them gets an earlier or faster start on growth, it 
can starve out the other two. 
Ecolo: Intriguing, but what implications does that have for human population growth? 
Philoso: It suggests to me that dynamic relations among unequal individuals may qualitatively change our 
understanding of population growth. 
Ecolo: Really? How might that be so? 
Reso (a researcher who analyzes natural resources issues): I can help here. Consider this simple 
scenario (Taylor 1997 [CL essay]). There are two countries. Each has the same amount and quality of 
arable land, the same population size, the same level of technical capacity, and the same population 
growth rate, say 3% per year. Country A, however, has a relatively equal land distribution, while country B 
has a typical 1970s Central American land distribution: 2% of the people own 60% of the land; 70% own 
just 2%. Both countries double their populations very rapidly, but five generations (120 years) before 
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anyone is malnourished in country A, all of the poorest 70% in country B would already be-unless they act 
to change their situation. 
Ecolo: But sooner or later in both countries everyone reaches the carrying capacity of their land. 
Reso: This is not just an issue of when the crisis occurs in the two countries. B's poor would probably first 
experience what others call population pressure in the form of food shortages. They would link these 
shortages to inequity in land distribution (see Durham 1979; Vandermeer 1977). They might attempt to 
take over the underutilized land of the wealthy. The wealthy, anticipating this possibility, might fund 
paramilitary operations that target leaders of campaigns for land reform. Or build factories that employ the 
land-starved poor. The availability and nature of foreign aid would influence the actual choices in specific 
instances. And so on. 
Activo: Does this mean that we should support land reform and abandon population control programs? Or 
are you saying that we should back up these programs by boosting military aid to countries like B? 
Reso: I would have to ask to whom "we" refers. People are never all part of a uniform "we;" no real 
country is like country A. The important thing to understand is that the crises to which actual people have 
to respond come well before and in different forms from the crises predicted on the basis of aggregate 
population growth rates and ultimate biological and physical limits to growth. Indeed, in a country like B 
the poor would be justified in viewing anyone who focuses on population control policies as taking sides 
with those who benefit from the inequitable access to productive resources. 
Ecolo: I have always stressed that affluent countries and people have disproportionate effect on the 
environment because of their higher per capita consumption of resources and the corresponding higher 
production of pollutants. 
Reso: But I'm not just saying that in any district, country, or ecosphere there are richer and poorer people. 
My point is that groups with different wealth and power exist, change, and become involved in crises 
because of their dynamic interrelations. 
Ecolo: OK, but even if the dynamics of population growth are more complex, it is still true that the greater 
the population, the greater the environmental effects. 
Reso: Not neccesarily. Consider this case of soil erosion in a mountainous agricultural region in Oaxaca, 
Mexico (García-Barrios and García-Barrios 1990). The severe soil erosion evident now is not the first 
occurrence of such a problem in the region. After the Spanish conquest, when the indigenous population 
collapsed from disease, the communities abandoned their terraced lands, which then eroded. The 
remaining populations concentrated in the valleys and adopted labor-saving practices from the Spanish, 
such as cultivating wheat and using plows. As the population recovered during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, collective institutions evolved that reestablished terraces. Erosion was reduced,soil 
dynamics were stablizied, and soil accumulation was perhaps stimulated. But this type of landscape 
transformation needed continuous and proper maintenance. If a terrace were allowed to erode the soil 
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would wash down and damage lower terraces; there was the potential for severe slope instability. What 
made the necessary maintenance possible was the collective institutions I mentioned, which first revolved 
around the Church and then, after independence from Spain, the rich Indians, caciques. These 
institutions mobilized peasant labor for key activities, which, in addition to maintaining terraces, included 
sowing corn in work teams and maintaining a diversity of maize varieties and cultivation techniques. The 
caciques benefitted from what was produced, but were expected to look after the peasants in hard times, 
a so-called moral economy (Scott 1976). Given that the peasants felt security in proportion to the wealth 
and prestige of their cacique, and given that prestige attached directly to each person's role in the 
collective labor, the labor tended to be very efficient. In addition, peasants were kept indebted to 
caciques, and could not readily break their unequal relationship. The caciques, moreover, insulated this 
relationship from change by resisting potential labor-saving technologies and ties to outside markets in 
maize. 
The Mexican revolution ruptured the closed system of reciprocal, albeit unequal, obligations and benefits 
by taking away the power of the caciques and opening the communities to the changing outside world. 
Many peasants migrated to industrial areas, sending cash back or bringing it with them when they 
returned to the community for periods of time. Rural population declined; transactions became 
monetarized; and prestige no longer derived from one's place in the collective labor. With the 
monetarization and loss of labor, the collective institutions collapsed and terraces began to erode. 
National food-pricing policies favored urban consumers, which meant that corn was grown only for 
subsistence needs in this area. Little incentive remained for intensive agricultural production. New labor-
saving activities, such as goat herding, which contributes in its own way to erosion, were taken up without 
new local institutions to regulate them. 
Ecolo: You're saying that environmental degradation was associated with population decline. But how far 
can you generalize from this one case? 
Philoso: Good question. 
Activo: Are you saying that environmentalists should support feudal-like social systems? 
Reso: I don't think any such simple lessons follow. Let me show you a diagram that summarizes the 
different strands of this case (figure 2). (The dashed lines indicate connections across the different 
strands of the schema. The zig-zag lines indicate institutions that rely on relationships of inequality.) 
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Reso: Except when I need to grab someone's attention, I don't highlight the relationship between 
environmental degradation and the population decline shown in the top strand. After all, it's not population 
but labor that is important in this case. Labor is something defined by the technologies of production (the 
second strand) and the social institutions that govern it. Such institutions operate both locally (the third 
strand) and at places distant from where the erosion occurs (the fourth strand). Any relationship between 
population and environmental change is highly mediated, depending on the technologies used and the 
local and national social and economic institutions through which labor and production are organized. No 
one kind of thing, no single strand on its own, could be sufficient to explain the currently eroded hillsides. 
Ecolo: The diagram helps, but I have to admit that these various strands are difficult for me to think about. 
I don't have training in the sociology, economics, and politics of rural institutions. I have to spend more 
time thinking about the soil erosion case and your two-countries story. 
Activo: But you have campaigned for policy changes on the basis of population projections. Without 
training in the social sciences, you had confidence to do that. 
Philoso: Moreover, developments in your own scientific field provided critical perspectives on aggregate 
population projections. Why hadn't you explored the new science? 
Ecolo: I'm not sure. I'll have to think more about both of your challenges. 
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Philoso: OK, we'll lay off for a while, Ecolo. Reso, can I go back to the issue of how one might generalize 
from your case? Putting aside the specific details, could the underlying structure serve as a template to 
guide further field research on environmental issues? The particular details emerging from this new 
research would inevitably modify the structure, but researchers would still be better off than they would if 
they'd started from scratch. 
Reso: What is the "underlying structure" as you see it? 
Philoso: I think we can discern processes operating at different spatial and temporal scales. These work 
together not only to produce specific outcomes but to continuously transform one another and the 
situation as a whole. No one process-for example, population growth or growth in Mexican industry-is 
sufficient on its own to explain the environmental and social changes in that part of Oaxaca. The analysis 
centers on a local problem, erosion, but is "trans-local" in its explanation of that problem. 
Reso: Yes, you've captured the way I see things. Reading the anthropologist Eric Wolf (1982: 387) led me 
to call this an "intersecting processes" model of complexity. 
Philoso: Is "intersecting" the right word? It implies that population change, agricultural ecological 
production, (re)organization of local institutions, industrialization, etc., are separate processes, which 
happen sometimes to influence each other. 
Reso: Perhaps we could invent a new word, then-"intrasecting"-to denote that the processes are actually 
inseparable constituent strands of an overall process. But I have to admit that I'm also uncertain about 
whether to use the term "process" at all. I'm trying simply to point to sequences of events that persist or 
are repeated long enough for us to notice them and need to explain them. For some people "process" 
connotes a basic underlying causal structure. Events come to be seen either as instances of the process 
or as noisy deviations from it. 
Activo: While you are worrying about terms and concepts appropriate for the complexity, I'm worrying 
about the practical political implications. At first I thought I was getting the hang of your perspective, 
Reso. You're saying we have to consider the differential contributions different people make to 
environmental problems, and how these contributions are interdependent strands of the overall dynamics 
of social, as well as environmental, change. This means that people have to identify where they are 
positioned-or where they are trying to position themselves-within the particular dynamics of each case. 
Ecolo: Before you get to the "but," can you make this concrete for me? 
Activo: I could imagine conservationists from the U.S.A. coming into the region and promoting restrictions 
on goat grazing. Or grassroots development workers helping the community organize the new local 
institutions that, among other things, would regulate goat grazing so as to limit its effect on erosion. 
Reso: A government policy of making credit available for new local enterprises could help. Otherwise, to 
keep up with the high interest rates money-lenders demand, everyone has to find wage-paying jobs-often 
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out of the region. Few can spare their labor to supervise goat grazing, however persuasive the 
conservationists may be. Yet the trend in Mexico, ever since the debt crisis of 1982, is to curtail 
government programs for poor sectors of the economy and promote export industries. Perhaps someone 
in the U.S.A. needs to pressure the international lending banks to ease up on their demands for indebted 
nations to reduce government expenditure for the poor. 
Activo: And so on-I imagine we could identify many more positions from which different groups could 
attempt to influence the ongoing social and environmental change. Multiplying positions of engagement 
seems a positive alternative to exhorting us all to reduce population growth and consumption. My 
problem, Reso, is that the intersecting-processes perspective also implies that the different groups should 
not think of themselves as engaging separately. The significance of their actions depends on actions 
taken by others at different positions. How would you propose to get different groups collaborating or, at 
least, co-ordinating their efforts? 
Reso: That's a big challenge. In fact, I get quite daunted when I reflect on an observation the cultural 
analyst Raymond Williams made, namely that, in the face of a progression of crises, there has been a 
tendency for "the practical cancellation of detailed, partipat[ory], consciously chosen planning." Crises are 
"simply exposures of existing real relations" in societies, he argued, yet it has been crisis-managers, who 
pursue a "politics of temporary tactical advantage" (Williams 1983, p.11-12), to whom citizens have been 
abdicating control of their futures. And in the time since Williams wrote, the idea of social planning has 
become further discredited through association with centrally planned economies that have failed and 
collapsed. 
Ecolo: Aren't you asking too much, Activo, of Reso? Not only does he have to make sense of the 
complexity of the situation he has studied, but you're asking him to think through all the ways that different 
people employ his accounts in their subsequent actions or policy recommendations. I think he should be 
allowed to concentrate on his social scientific investigations, all the better to convince people like me that 
he can provide a more faithful account of the way the world really works. 
Sociolo (who interprets the directions taken in science): I am sceptical of such a separation. Almost 
everything I've been quietly listening to has reinforced my view that when scientists make claims about 
the world-and here I refer to social as well as natural scientists- they also reveal their social concerns and 
commitments. 
Philoso: What does it mean to claim ideas refer to two different kinds of things-the world and the scientist-
in-society-at the same time? 
Sociolo: First, let me ask you where individual-based models came from and why they emerged at the 
time they did. 
Philoso: I don't know. I could hypothesize that someone borrowed the idea from another field. But then I'd 
have to explain how they arose in that field, wouldn't I? Perhaps many people had thought of them, but 
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the powerful computers needed to handle them weren't available until a decade ago. What's your 
explanation? 
Sociolo: I don't know either. I'd have to investigate. But let me take a few steps back to explain the 
position from which my questions to you came. Notice that Ecolo's science of population projections is not 
simply determined by the nature of the world. Individual-based models and Reso's scenario of the two 
countries indicate that qualitatively different growth trajectories can result when models include dynamic 
relations among unequal individuals. Given these choices about how to model growth, we have to 
consider other influences to explain which models a scientist uses. 
Philoso: Not necessarily. I am happy with the idea that Ecolo simply hasn't caught up with the better 
theories currently available for explaining population growth and environmental change. When he and his 
colleagues do, the accepted theory will be the one that represents the world most faithfully. 
Sociolo: Personal and social influences might keep Ecolo from catching up as quickly as others have. 
Philoso: Yes, but the effects are transient. By the time that a scientific community reaches a strong 
consensus about a theory, it is the world, and not the idiosyncratic situations of the members of the 
community, that accounts for the consensus. 
Sociolo: How do you determine whether, and for what aspects of a theory, scientists are in the transient 
period? How do you know that they have reached the reliable consensus? 
Philoso: When we look back over previous decades and centuries it is usually obvious. 
Sociolo: Yes, but I'm interested in understanding science as it actually happens, not science only when it 
has settled down to a persistent consensus. 
Ecolo: I'm with you in that regard-I wouldn't have thought that the science behind aggregate population 
models could be replaced by a better theory. But how would you explain my reliance-before this 
discussion, at least-on such models? 
Sociolo: I would really need time to study you doing your work. 
Ecolo: You also said that when asked to explain the origin of individual-based models. Can you at least 
venture some hypotheses? 
Sociolo: OK. It is in the nature of people's cognitive functioning that they hold onto theories, at least for a 
time, in the face of accumulating counter evidence. Even though you don't seem very rigid, Ecolo, change 
can be inhibited by the language you're accustomed to. For example, the term "population"-we've all been 
using it-connotes an entity with all its components tied into one uniform whole. Undifferentiated analysis 
was certainly the dominant paradigm in the ecological community when you were a student, and even 
with the advent of individual-based models the textbooks show that your scientific community has by no 
means let go of that paradigm. So psychology, language, and paradigms reinforced by one's community 
probably all contribute to your reliance on aggregate population models. 
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Activo: Remember that my interest is in the policies or actions that follow from the science. How helpful is 
it to examine the ways that scientists do or do not change their ideas? 
Philoso: Surely you want your actions to be based on the best scientific accounts. 
Activo: Yes, but can knowledge about how science is made help me take action more effectively? After 
all, when it comes to taking action, Reso's analysis of social and environmental change and the 
differential contributions different people make gives me more than enough to work on. 
Sociolo: As I said before, I do not believe the realm in which scientists make claims about the world can 
be separated from the social situations, broadly construed, that facilitate scientists' work. Let me illustrate 
the connection between science and social action with a simple classification of environmental analyses. 
I distinguish three broad analytic orientations regarding environment and society. They differ in the units 
of analysis-the kind of person or other agent who is involved in phenomenon-and in the implied limit-that 
makes the phenomenon a problem. Reso's two-countries story gives us two of those orientations. On one 
island there were unequal, differentiating units, linked in their economic, social, and political dynamics, 
facing limits that are primarily social, and only sometimes biophysically conditioned. On the other island 
were uniform, undifferentiated units, which can be simply aggregated, and which face biophysical limits 
when they grow. I would add a third orientation, which acknowledges the existence of rich and poor 
strata, but does not provide an account of the dynamics that generate and maintain inequality. 
What's important is not simply that the "differentiated dynamics" orientation is, as Reso showed us, 
probably more faithful to the actual complexity of the world. The different analyses suggest different 
conceptions of what social action is favored. The "differentiated dynamics" orientation, as Activo and 
Reso discussed earlier, means that different people have to identify where they are positioned-or where 
they are trying to position themselves-within the particular dynamics of each case. The "uniform units" 
orientation implies what I would call moral and technocratic political tendencies (Taylor 1997 [How do we], 
Taylor and Garc a Barrios 1997). In technocratic formulations, objective, scientific analyses-often 
quantitative in form-identify the policies needed in order to restore order or ensure the sustainability or 
survival of society or humanity. Individuals, citizens, and countries are then expected to submit to those 
policies. Moral formulations, in contrast, avoid coercion and rely on each individual to make the change 
needed to maintain valued social or natural qualities of life. Yet in many senses the moral and 
technocratic approaches are allied. Both command our attention by stressing the severity of the crisis and 
threat to our social order . The solutions invoke common, undifferentiated interests as a corrective to 
scientifically ignorant leadership or corrupt, self-serving or naive governance. Moreover, although the 
solutions are supposed to apply uniformly to all of us, special places in the proposed social 
transformations are reserved for their exponents. The technocrat has a place as analyst or policy advisor; 
the moralist has a place as guide, educator or leader. 
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Ecolo: The uniform orientation seems like a straw person. Everyone recognizes that there are richer and 
poorer people and countries that have different effects on the environment. 
Sociolo: That's where the third "stratified units" orientation comes in, but it occupies an uncertain middle 
ground. Suppose contraception is promoted among the poor to curb population growth and reduced 
consumption is promoted among the affluent to reduce the disproportionate environmental effect of their 
slower growing or stable population. Are these or other stratified policies and practices meant to be any 
different from those given by separate uniform analyses, one restricted to the poor, the other to the 
affluent? If so, more needs to be said. In particular, how and why are the proposals supposed to work? 
This question raises the need for an analysis of the dynamics, redirecting us along the "differentiated 
dynamics" orientation. 
Philoso: There's certain logic to your claim that uniform analysis implies moral or technocratic politics, but 
do you have evidence to back this up? 
Sociolo: Language is one line of evidence. It is very common for people talking about the population 
problem-or, more generally, talking about global environmental problems-to employ terms of moral 
recruitment and education and of management. One illustration cannot prove this, but it can help make 
my point plausible, so let me review an editorial by Meffe, Ehrlich and Ehrenfeld in the journal 
Conservation Biology (Meffe et al. 1993). 
Ecolo: I know that piece. Indeed, I have often drawn the attention of my students and colleagues to it. 
Sociolo: Well, see what you think of my reading of it. The editorial states that conservation biologists 
"possess the professional responsibility to teach humankind about the perils" (p.2) of continued 
population growth. These scientists have "the obligation to provide leadership in addressing the human 
population problem and developing solutions" (p.2), and are able to "help promote policies to curb rapid 
population growth" (p.3). The language speaks of leadership, in educating others and in policy 
formulation. The authors go on to say that "the population problem is stunningly clear"-as science shows-
"and ought to be beyond denial" (p.2). Such statements suggest that social change is related to the 
psychology of individuals. This moral tendency is again evident when humankind is treated as if it were 
one person: "The human species ignores or denies" the impending calamity (p.2). A brief mention of the 
"critical importance... of educating and empowering women" (p.3) in the next to last paragraph hints that 
all people might not be equally responsible, but the conclusion returns to the dominant undifferentiated 
formulation: "Action is needed from everyone, at every turn...[in the cause of] human population control. 
Life itself is at stake" (p.3). Politics is simultaneously about morally committed individuals taking action 
and about control and management. Either way, the animating force is the seriousness of the problem. 
Ecolo: This kind of language is used by almost everyone I work with in the environmental area. I can see 
that I sometimes come across as a moralist when I invoke my own record of reduced consumption and 
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small family size. But I don't think of myself as a technocrat. The very fact that I've kept listening to you 
suggests a lot more openness than "technocrat" connotes. 
Philoso: Can I jump in for you here, Sociolo? The logic and evidence, Ecolo, creates a strong 
presumption that uniform analyses are connected to moral-technocratic politics. If you depart from this 
"null hypothesis," there must be other factors operating in your science or politics that you haven't yet 
shown us. 
Sociolo: Indeed. The very purpose of this simple three-part classification is to elicit responses that reveal 
more about what shapes your actions and practices as a scientist who works in a specific social context. 
Philoso: Alternatively, as you mentioned earlier, you could observe Ecolo working, review his lectures, 
papers, grant applications, and so on, and produce a particular account of his knowledge-making. This 
field work is analogous to that from which Reso generated the soil erosion case. 
Sociolo: Yes, the simple three-part classification is not essential to my research and analysis. 
Activo: Not so fast-it seems to be my role in this discussion to almost, but not quite, appreciate what's 
being said. I understand, Sociolo, the connections, both logical and linguistic, that you draw between the 
kinds of environmental analysis and the conceptions of social action. I remember you introduced your 
classification to show me that the realm in which scientists make claims about the world should not be 
considered separately from the social situations that facilitate the work scientists do. But are you saying 
that the views of social action scientists favor lead them to accept certain environmental analyses? Or is it 
that their environmental analyses lead them to favor certain social actions? Furthermore, whether the 
politics is an upstream influence on the science or a downstream consequence of it, the realm in which 
scientists make their claims still seems separate . 
Philoso: Good point. 
Sociolo: I see the relationship as reciprocal. The arrows between science and social action point both 
ways. I'm not talking only of the crude social influences on science, evident, for example, when 
foundations fund research on population and biophysical limits more often than they do the kind of socio-
environmental research Reso described. Even reciprocal isn't quite the right idea. When I get into the 
particular cases, I find certain courses of action facilitated over others in the problems chosen, categories 
used, relationships studied, evidence required, equipment used, time spent in the field, kind of 
interactions pursued with the subjects investigated, and so on. That's what I mean when I say the 
complex socio-environmental situation ought not be seen as separate from the complex situation that 
makes the research possible. 
Philoso: Intriguing, but you'd need to demonstrate this to me. 
Sociolo: Of course, but for this I have to do my field work on Ecolo or others like him. 
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Activo: And we might ask someone to do field work observing you, so as to understand the factors 
shaping your work. 
Sociolo: Right. 
Reso: Before we direct all our energies in that direction, it occurs to me that Sociolo's simple three-part 
classification is like my two-countries scenario. I believe that detailed accounts of particular cases are 
more faithful to social and natural reality. However, simpler, general claims, such as "population growth 
leads to environmental degradation," are easier to convey and receive more notice than more 
complicated, particularistic ones. 
Philoso: Yet the simpler accounts are not only rougher approximations, but, as the soil erosion case 
showed us, sometimes they are wrong. 
Activo: And they facilitate policies and actions with unintended and even undesirable consequences, 
especially when international conservationists have been drawn into coalitions with the state and 
militarized institutions (Peluso 1993). 
Reso: I agree with both of you. That's why I've started to think that an in-between approach is needed, 
one in which we formulate propositions that are simple enough to communicate, but disturb the simple 
analyses and always point to the need for further work to address the complexity of particular cases. 
Ecolo: I see-the two-countries picture sticks with me, even though I've already forgotten the details of the 
soil erosion case. And the "disturbing" proposition would be that I should consider how the analysis of 
causes and the implications of the analysis would change if undifferentiated units, often simply combined 
into statistical aggregates, were replaced by unequal units, subject to further differentiation as a result of 
their linked economic, social, and political dynamics. 
Philoso: Now I understand why Reso and Sociolo didn't proceed directly to particular complex accounts. 
Sociolo: Yes, and that is another example of the ways that our representations of the world build in ideas 
about social action-in this case, simply ideas about how to help our audience digest the material we 
present and use it in their own work and thought. 
Activo: "Simply"? Remember how Reso's particular account of the soil erosion case exposed multiple 
positions from which different groups could attempt to influence the ongoing social and environmental 
change. Surely, there'd be an equivalent situation if you produced a particular analysis of some scientific 
accounts of social and environmental change and then wanted to use it to influence the ongoing making 
of science. 
Sociolo: You're right to bring me back to this issue. And I would make the picture even more complex by 
linking my accounts and Reso's. Given that certain courses of action are facilitated over others in the 
making of science, influencing the making of science should be part of influencing the environment and 
society-the situations that the science is studying. 
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Ecolo: My head is spinning. I'm not sure I could learn to grapple with these layers of complexity. I'm not 
even sure that it would be helpful to me if I did. 
Philoso: Yes, given Ecolo's scientific training and skills, wouldn't he be more likely to influence others if he 
focused on improving the science in the population-environment area? 
Sociolo: This may indeed be a pragmatic course of action for him. But can I turn the tables, Philoso, and 
probe the model you're promoting here? In trying to separate analysis of the making of science from 
analyses of environment or society, are you claiming that all the different activities scientists engage in to 
be able to do their work and have it recognized do not change what is held to be justifiably true about the 
world? 
Philoso: If I were, that would be a strong claim. I'd have to demonstrate that no changes in those activities 
would have produced a significantly different account of the world. I'll have to think through this logic and 
spend more time scrutinizing the evidence in this area. 
Sociolo: Can you explain why you haven't before? 
Philoso: No. I'll have to think more about that as well. 
Activo: I can see another angle on the question of why Ecolo and Philoso want to focus on scientific 
analysis. Reso has identified weaknesses, conceptually and in terms of evidence, of simple models in 
which population growth leads to environmental degradation. And I hinted at the undesired consequences 
of policy that invokes those models. Suppose some scientists who had used simple models heard these 
critiques and found them plausible. They might then decide to investigate the differentiated relationships 
among population, social organization, technology, and environment. However, the resources they would 
need would be complex and varied, like the socio-environmental situations they would study. Even 
though Reso and I know this, we might focus on our critique of the science and leave it up to the 
scientists to rework their particular tools, collaborations, models, funding, and so on. 
Reso: So when we separate analysis of how science is made from analyses of environment or society 
could be made, we might have made one of my kind of in-between propositions. 
Sociolo: I understand, but it's hard for me to accept this. I feel that the more comprehensive my account 
of the science, the more helpful it will be to scientists attempting to modify the direction of their work. But I 
realize this is inconsistent with my position that the actual state of the world is insufficient to account for 
what becomes established as knowledge of the world. 
Reso: Don't get too upset, Sociolo, about this inconsistency. Helping scientists understand the complexity 
of the situation that enables their work may be no guarantee that they'll be able to effectively reshape that 
situation. But who needs guarantees? Wouldn't it be interesting and revealing if scientists could think 
systematically about the situatedness of their research at the same time as they probed complex 
ecological and social situations? 
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Activo: How would you do that? 
Sociolo: That's a challenge I need to think more about. 
Reso: It seems that each of us has identified questions we need to work more on. 
Sociolo: And we've had questions opened up by interaction with each other. 
Philoso: That's what our host claimed would happen when he invited us to meet, but I'm not sure that this 
is typical. 
Sociolo: And I'm not sure that others reading what we've said would decide to take up these different 
questions. 
Activo: So we'll have to ask our host to think about which conditions make interactions among people 
from different fields as open as our were today. 
Ecolo: Right. 
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